Introduction
The determinants of matching labour demand and labour supply to create new jobs are of continual interest for both labour market researchers and politicians. In part, because it is difficult to observe the individual search processes that underlie this type of matching on the micro level, studies in this field typically refer to the analytical results obtained using macroeconomic matching functions that model the empirical dependency of the number of new hires on the number of job-seekers and vacancies in a particular context of interest; for an overview, compare the surveys of Petrongolo/Pissarides (2001) , Rogerson/ Shimer/Wright (2005) , and Yashiv (2007) . These studies help to elucidate the efficiency of matching processes both in aggregated and partial labour markets. Therefore, some studies have examined particular sectors (Broersma/Ours, 1999) , regions (Anderson/Burgess, 2000; Kangasharju/Pehkonen/Pekkala, 2005) , or occupational groups, which are classes of jobs that share extensive commonalities in their qualification requirements and tasks (Entorf, Mai 1994; Fahr/Sunde, 2004; Mora, John James/Santacruz, Jose Alfonso, 2007; Stops/Mazzoni, 2010) . The central assumption of most studies in this field is that partial labour markets are completely separated from each other; in other words, there are no flows of job-seekers from one partial labour market to another partial labour market, and no correlations exist between different labour markets with respect to newly created jobs or numbers of job vacancies. This central assumption is not presumed by studies of regional labour markets (e.g., Burda/Profit, 1996; Fahr/Sunde, 2006; Dauth/Hujer, Reinhard/Wolf, 2010; Lottmann, 2012) that consider the penetrability of partial labour markets.
However, to date, no study of occupational labour markets has considered the dependencies between these partial labour markets. In investigations by Entorf (Mai 1994) ; Fahr/Sunde (2004) ; Mora, John James/ Santacruz, Jose Alfonso (2007) ; Stops/Mazzoni (2010) , the number of new jobs in a certain occupational group is explained by the number of unemployed workers and vacancies in the occupational group of interest.
In this paper, I use both empirical and theoretical arguments to demonstrate that the assumption of separate occupational labour markets is not appropriate. I test my hypotheses using pooled ordinary least squares (pooled OLS), fixed effects and pooled mean-group models that include cross-sectional dependency lags for regressors. Therefore, the estimators consider the interactions between cross-sectional units. To achieve this purpose, I construct an empirically based "occupational topology" that respects the considerations of Gathmann/Schönberg (2010) and Matthes/Burkert/Biersack (2008) . I also discuss a new potential source for biased estimations of matching elasticities, namely, the omission of job searchers and vacancies in other occupations from consideration.
In the following section, I describe the motivation and theoretical framework of my estimation approach for the matching function. In section 3, I present the data used in this study, and the empirical estimates are subsequently provided in section 4. Section 5 summarises the main results of the investigation and discusses several questions that may be answered in future research.
Motivation and theoretical framework
The standard model of the matching function assumes the existence of a homogeneous pool of unemployed workers and a homogeneous pool of vacancies. The search activities of both sides of the market sides can be described as a matching technology. The processes underlying this matching procedure are not explicitly modelled; 1 instead, the matching process can be regarded as a black box (Petrongolo/Pissarides, 2001) . The variables U , V and M can be used to represent the number of unemployed workers, vacancies and new hires (matches), respectively. The matching function f (U, V ) is often specified using a Cobb-Douglas functional form:
where A describes the "augmented" matching productivity (e.g., Fahr/Sunde, 2004) . The coefficients β U and β V represent the matching elasticities of the unemployed workers and the vacancies, respectively. In accordance with standard matching theory, both elasticities are positive. Furthermore, the theoretical model assumes constant returns to scale, which implies that β U + β V = 1 with β U , β V > 0.
In the following, the assumption of homogeneous pools of vacancies and unemployed workers will be relaxed: It is reasonable to assume that occupation-specific differences exist with respect to the matching processes due to differences in job requirements, apprenticeships and other factors (for empirical evidence, see Fahr/Sunde, 2004; Stops/Mazzoni, 2010) . In Germany in particular, occupations are more suitable units than regions or economic sectors for analyses of matching processes (compare with Fahr/Sunde, 2004) : Occupations include specific qualification requirements, tasks, and other characteristics. Furthermore, individuals in Germany acquire occupation-specific knowledge during the course of their careers. Typically, firms with vacancies attempt to hire workers with certain qualifications, whereas job searchers seek jobs in certain occupations. The aforementioned studies (Fahr/Sunde, 2004; Stops/Mazzoni, 2010) assume that the number of new jobs in an occupational group does not depend on the number of unemployed workers and vacancies in other occupational groups. Fahr/Sunde (2004) propose the existence of partial occupational labour markets that are aggregates of specific occupational groups. These labour markets should be separated from each other; no flows of workers between different occupational labour markets should occur, and no correlations should exist between different labour markets with respect to newly created jobs or numbers of job vacancies, but this may be the case within these markets. Both Fahr/Sunde (2004) and Stops/Mazzoni (2010) use the variation over the occupational groups that are assigned to each occupational labour market to estimate matching elasticities for these markets. However, these researchers do not explicitly engage in either empirical or theoretical considerations of the flows or correlations between occupational groups. Therefore, these researchers assume that partial labour markets are completely separate in terms of occupational groups.
This assumption is quite strong because occupational labour markets could certainly interact with each other with respect to the matching process. One argument for the existence of these interactions is that both unemployed and employed persons change their occupations during their employment biographies (Fitzenberger/Spitz, 2004; Seibert, 2007; Kambourov/Manovskii, 2009; Schmillen/Möller, 2010; Gathmann/Schönberg, 2010 ). An observation of the flows of individuals into employment between 1982 and 2007 reveals that the shares of these flows that involve occupational changes can be rather high for various industries. In particular, these shares range from 16 per cent (the occupational changes of former foresters and huntsmen) to 75 per cent (the occupational changes of polymer processors; for more detailed information, see section A.3 of the appendix).
From a theoretical point of view, the incorporation of flows between occupational labour markets causes analyses of the matching process to become considerably more complex: job searchers must decide on their search strategy with respect to their optimal number of job interviews in several different occupational labour markets.
In the following discussions, I refer to a theoretical matching model that provides deeper insights into the implications for the matching elasticities for unemployed workers and vacancies that derive from the fact that job and worker searches occur not only within occupational labour markets but also across these markets. Although the structure of this model is based on a paper by Burda/Profit (1996) , the interpretation of the model has been widely modified. All of the formal considerations for this model can be found in the Appendix A.1. According to the model, an individual's optimal search intensity for a job search depends negatively on the probability of obtaining a job after completing a job application, negatively on the costs of the job search, and positively on the returns for a successful job search in terms of wages. The negative relationship between optimal job search intensity and the probability of obtaining a job after application could be explained by the assumption that the search costs will be linear and should be small relative to the expected revenues from the job search. 2
In an analysis of regional labour markets, Burda/Profit (1996) complement fixed search costs with a variable element that depends positively on the regional distance between the region in which a job searcher is situated and the region in which this individual is searching for jobs. With respect to permeability, occupational labour markets may be quite similar to regional labour markets. In particular, workers and vacancies are typically related to particular occupational groups. Nevertheless, workers and firms often do not limit their search to a single occupational labour market. With respect to regional labour markets, various metrics, such as geographic distances or commuting flows, should represent the strength of the interdependencies (and causal relationships) between economic activities 2 This finding contradicts the standard assumption of the discouraged worker hypothesis (Pissarides, 2000) .
According to this hypothesis, workers increase their job search intensity if the probability of obtaining a job increases but give up their job searches if the expected revenues of this search are relatively low. This hypothesis is derived from a model that assumes that search costs exponentially increase with job search intensity. Under the conditions, of this model, the optimal job search intensity positively depends on the job finding probability. The framework of this model is rather controversial; in particular, Shimer (2005) reveals that this model "[...] cannot generate business-cycle-frequency fluctuations in unemployment and job vacancies in response to shocks of a plausible magnitude[...]". One reason for this deficiency in the model could be that workers do not behave in accordance with the model's predictions. In a recession, the expected revenues of job searches may become quite low because of the decreased wages and smaller number of vacancies (which decrease the probability of finding a job); nonetheless, it could be reasonable for workers to increase their efforts to find a job under these difficult economic conditions. By contrast, in an economic upswing, workers may decrease their job search intensity because they know that a high search intensity is not required to obtain a job.
in different regions. In many instances, the topology of the regions of interest provides a good notion of the relationships that must be analysed: In occupational labour markets, the topology becomes more complex because there are no physical restrictions on the number of borders and neighbours of particular occupational groups. Thus, metrics are required that represent the similarity of occupational groups with respect to their property as alternatives for both job searchers and firms that seek workers.
In the following analyses, I differentiate only between the case of two or more occupations that are similar and thus constitute plausible alternatives in the job search and matching process and the opposite case of dissimilar occupations. Therefore, in the model, I assume that the variable portion of search costs could be zero if a job searcher is searching in his former occupational labour market, positive but moderate in situations involving a job search in similar occupational markets, or prohibitively high if the job search occurs in dissimilar occupational labour markets. In the case of job searches in dissimilar occupational labour markets, the optimal search intensity should be very low or even zero.
This approach directly implies that the number of matches in a certain occupation is determined not only by the number of unemployed workers and vacancies in the occupation itself but also by the number of unemployed workers and vacancies in similar alternative occupations. Therefore, the empirical matching function should be augmented accordingly.
One can differentiate between the observed occupational market and similar occupational markets with respect to vacancies and unemployed workers. Thus, the following general modified matching function may be obtained:
where M i , A i , U i , and V i represent the matches, "augmented" matching productivity, unemployed workers, and vacancies in an occupational group i respectively. The term g(U i j ) denotes the functional relationship between the new hires in occupational group i and the sum of all unemployed persons in all occupational groups J that are similar to the observed occupational group i; similarly, h(V i j ) denotes the functional relationship between these new hires and the sum of the vacancies in occupational groups J. 3
Based on a quasi-reduced form of the matching model, 4 the sign of these matching elasticities is determined by two mechanisms. The number of matches in a certain occupation decreases due to an increase in the number of unemployed workers in similar occupations due to decreases in the probability that a worker will receive a job offer in the occupation of interest. Simultaneously, this decreased probability of receiving a job offer causes a higher optimal job search intensity, assuming that the expected gain from a job search is significantly higher than the search (and travel) costs and that these costs are small in total and linearly increase with the number of job applications; this increase in search intensity tends to produce a higher number of job matches. Increasing the stock of vacancies, cet. par., would cause more matches due to a higher job finding rate but would also produce indirect negative effects due to the tendency towards lower optimal search intensities. Finally, the matching elasticities of the unemployed and vacancies in similar occupations could both have positive signs if the (optimal) job search elasticity of the job finding rate is negative and lies in a certain range less than zero 5 .
3 Data I construct a panel data set that is similar in its structure but larger in its time dimension than the data set that was used by Stops/Mazzoni (2010); Fahr/Sunde (2004 (Dorner et al., 2010) . The number of new hires in the occupational groups is equal to the sum of flows to employment in each occupational group for each examined period (which ranges from October 1st of a year to September 30th of the following year). I calculated the number of new hires in the national economy using a ratio estimator that was suggested by Cochran (1977: pp. 150 ) and applied by Stops/Mazzoni (2010) . In particular, the number of new hires is divided by the employment levels from the SIAB 1975 -2008 data, and the resulting quotient is then multiplied by the employment levels 7 from the employment statistics of the Federal Employment Agency. This ratio estimator is more accurate than a simple extrapolation because the level of employment and the number of new hires are highly positively correlated. Because there are only 40 occupational sections in the employment statistics of the Federal Employment Agency, I assign the 81 occupational groups of this study to the 40 occupational sections (see table 5 in the appendix).
where the variables have following definitions: Another constraint of this study relates to the frequency of its time series. It has frequently been noted that information about the dynamic changes in the numbers of unemployed workers and vacancies is lost if yearly data are used; consequently, the estimation results could be biased (Petrongolo/Pissarides, 2001 : for a broader discussion, see). However, I am forced to neglect this issue because data with greater frequencies are not available for the observed period. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the aggregated stocks and flows from the data. 4 Empirical strategy and results
An occupational "topology"
The empirical approach of this work is based on the idea that cross-sectional units interact with others; this interaction effect implies that the average behaviour in a group influences the behaviours of the individuals that comprise this group (Manski, 1993; Elhorst, 2010) .
Analogously to a regional topology, which depends on the distances among the regions of interest, I derived an "occupational group topology" that relies on the similarities between occupational groups according to Matthes/Burkert/Biersack (2008) ; this table is provided in 6 in the appendix.
The fundamental concept of Matthes/Burkert/Biersack (2008) was to aggregate occupational groups that were somewhat "similar" or "homogeneous" according to the KldB 88 into occupational segments (Berufssegmente) following the concept outlined in an earlier version of Gathmann/Schönberg (2010) . In accordance with this approach, occupational groups on the 3-digit level 8 are similar if they are alternatives for each other for recruitment decisions by firms or for job search decisions by potential employees. This information is available from the Federal Employment Agency and its Central Occupational File (, Federal Employment Agency: Zentrale Berufedatei). To identify the similarities between certain occupational groups, the Federal Employment Service analysed not only the specific skills, licences, certificates, and knowledge but also the typical tasks and techniques involved in every occupational group (Matthes/Burkert/Biersack, 2008) .
I transform the results for occupational groups on the 3-digit level to occupational groups on the 2-digit level; this transformation is possible due to the hierarchical structure of the occupational classification scheme. The results of this procedure are summarised in table 6 in the appendix. Based on this information, I constructed a symmetric 81 × 81 first-order contiguity weight matrix W in which the value of one reflects correlations between similar occupational groups. The diagonal elements are set to zero.
One restriction to this approach must be noted. Certain 2-digit groups are not assigned to only one occupational segment because they contain particular 3-digit groups that belong to one segment and other 3-digit groups that belong to another segment 9 . However, these occupational groups could be regarded as occupations that are similar to more than one segment (e.g., segment A and segment B) because they include certain tasks or qualifications that are only found in segment A and other tasks or qualifications that are only found in segment B. Therefore, segments A and B are not necessarily similar.
Estimation approach and results
To examine the influences of exogenous regressors in other occupational groups, I use a modified Cobb-Douglas matching function with "spatial" lags for regressors to obtain concrete forms for the functional terms g(U i j ) and h(V i j ):
Therefore, in addition to the well-known matching elasticities β V and β U , two further matching elasticities, γ V and γ U , must be considered because these latter elasticities represent the effects of the dependencies of the occupational labour markets. At this stage, I present 8 The German occupational classification scheme 88 (KldB 88) code is a hierarchical construction that incorporates the following levels (from lowest to highest): occupational classes, which have a 4-digit code; occupational orders, which have a 3-digit code; occupational groups, which have a 2-digit-code; and occupational ranges, which have a 1-digit code. This classification scheme implies that a certain occupational range includes certain occupational groups that each include certain occupational orders that each include certain occupational classes. 9 For example, consider occupational group 63 "technical specialist" in table 6. This group is assigned to "Miner/chemical occupations"; "Glass, ceramic, paper production"; and "Construction". the model assuming the availability of perfect information about job searchers, vacancies, and new hires. Subsequently, to overcome several shortcomings of the available data, I complement the model with a recession and a time trend variable. In the first step of the model construction, I apply a pooled ordinary least squares (Pooled OLS) estimation. This model is used as a reference for previous studies, such as the works of Fahr/Sunde (2004) or Stops/Mazzoni (2010) . This estimator is based on two further crucial assumptions: (i) the equality of the matching function parameters across all of the examined occupational groups and (ii) the stationarity of the used time series. In the second step of the estimation, I relax the assumption of the equality of the intercept by applying a fixed effects (FE) estimator. Finally, I relax assumption (ii) by applying a pooled mean-group model, an approach that was introduced by Pesaran/Shin/Smith (1999: S. 623).
Pooled OLS and fixed effects estimators
After taking the logarithm of both sides of equation (4), the Pooled OLS and FE models can be expressed in vector and matrix notation, respectively, using the following regression equation:
In accordance with the literature (LeSage/Pace, 2009: pp. 178), β V and β U can be interpreted as direct effects on the number of matches, and γ V and γ U can be interpreted as indirect effects (of the average of unemployed workers in similar occupational groups) on the number of matches. With respect to the field of labour market theory, it is important to not only provide a comparison of the impacts of vacancies and unemployed workers on the matching process but also analyse the returns to scale in terms of the sum of the matching elasticities. LeSage/Pace (2009: pp. 34) demonstrate that for the simple case of models with cross-sectional dependence regressors ("SLX" models), such as the models presented in this paper, the (average) total elasticity is simply the sum of the (direct) elasticities, β V and β U , and the indirect elasticities, γ V and γ U . Therefore, to analyse the returns to scale of the estimated matching functions, I provide a Wald test with the null hypothesis that the sum of all direct and indirect elasticities is unity 10 . Among others, Berman (1997) sets forth the argument that (monthly) numbers of the unemployed and vacancies are reduced by every hiring, eventually producing a downward bias in the estimated elasticities.
Several studies for different countries based on elasticity estimations without restrictions on the returns to scale empirically confirm this conjecture (see, e.g., Burda/Wyplosz, 1994; Fahr/Sunde, 2004; Stops/Mazzoni, 2010) . In fact, in this paper, a further potential source for underestimated elasticities is addressed, namely, the omission of job searchers and vacancies in similar occupational groups.
In the Pooled OLS version of the model, the "augmented" productivity coefficient A i is equal across all of the occupational groups; the value of this coefficient may vary in the FE version of the model. Furthermore, the model contains a trend coefficient ω and can 10 H0: βU + βV + γU + γV = 1 vs. Ha: βU + βV + γU + γV = 1 be interpreted as an indicator for the development of the matching productivity during the observation period.
Note that the observable numbers of vacancies and unemployed are proxies for all of the job searchers and vacancies on the labour market. The use of these proxies could produce biased estimates (Broersma/Ours, 1999; Anderson/Burgess, 2000; Fahr/Sunde, 2005; Sunde, 2007) . Therefore, Anderson/Burgess (2000) propose interpreting the empirical matching elasticities as quantities that are obtained from a "reduced" model. However, the number of all vacancies could be found if the ratios of the observable vacancies 11 to all vacancies were known. These ratios are reported on occasion (Heckmann/Kettner/Rebien, 2009 ), but data for the entire observation period are not available. However, Franz (2006) reports that these ratios demonstrate partially counter-cyclical characteristics. This finding can be used to obtain the unbiased coefficient for the matching elasticity of the vacancies. Therefore, I complemented the model by incorporating the cyclical component of the logarithm of the German real gross domestic product GDP cyc that is calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Hodrick/Prescott, 1997) 12 . In accordance with the work of Franz (2006), the coefficient of the GDP cyc is expected to be positive.
In columns (1) to (4) Robust standard errors are calculated in accordance with Huber and White. Information criteria are reported, including the Akaike information criterion (AIC, Akaike, 1974) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC, Schwarz, 1978) . According to the AIC and BIC, the models with the cross-sectional lags of the exogenous regressors should be preferred over the other examined models.
The matching elasticities of the unemployed workers and vacancies are significantly positive and robust in all variations of the model; however, these elasticities are rather small in the FE models. The positive coefficient of the cyclical component of the real GDP and the negative parameter of the trend are robust for all of the models except for the pooled OLS estimation.
The parameters for the impact of the regressors from other occupational groups, γ U and γ V , are both significant, positive, and robust for the FE models but not for the pooled OLS model; in this model, γ U is significant and negative. The null of a Wald test that both coeffi- 
Stationarity and the pooled mean-group model
The properties of the used panel variables are very important for ensuring that the correct estimator is applied. Blanchard/Diamond (1989: S. 55 ff.) report the results of augmented Dickey-Fuller tests that reject the null of non-stationarity. However, these researchers could not reveal the existence of cointegration in the observed data. Entorf (1998: pp. 79 ) confirmed that unit roots are quite seldom found in panel time series for certain metrics such as new hires, vacancies and unemployed workers. Fahr/Sunde (2004) use a stationarity test by Hadri (2000) with the null of stationarity and reveal that the null could not be rejected for their data. Stops/Mazzoni (2010) employ the same test for similar data with more observation timepoints and demonstrate that the null must be rejected.
I apply the same test for the data that are analysed in Stops/Mazzoni (2010) . The results indicate that the assumption of stationarity should not be maintained. The null of stationarity must be rejected for all of the time series of new hires, vacancies and unemployed workers. By contrast, the null could not be rejected for the first-order difference series because of the possibility of homoscedastic standard errors 14 . Thus, the time series are likely integrated of order 1. Furthermore, from a theoretical perspective, there is a longrun linear relationship between the logarithm of new hires and both unemployed workers and vacancies, and it can be conclusively assumed that these variables are co-integrated. Therefore, I apply the pooled mean-group model (PMG) conceived by Pesaran/Shin/Smith (1999) , which models these data characteristics well (Baltagi, 2002: p. 245 ). The base of the pooled mean-group estimator is an autoregressive distributive lag (l, q 1 , q 2 , ..., q k ) model (ARDL model) with q = q 1 = q 2 = ... = q k . This model is reparameterised in a error correction form. In this study, I use a reparameterised ARDL(1,1,1) model as follows:
In addition to the pooled OLS and FE estimators, the following variables are now implemented:
w i is the row vector of the ith row of the weight matrix bf W , There is an adjustment process for log M i,t ; the error-correction term φ i on the right-hand side of equation (6) denotes the speed of adjustment, whereas the term in the square brackets represents deviations from the long-run equilibrium. If φ i is equal to the null, then there is no long-run equilibrium between the dependent and independent variables. A significant negative parameter indicates that the variables tend to a long-run steady state.
The pooled mean-group estimator includes the fixed effects and short-run dynamics of the variables for each occupational group i and requires the long-term coefficients to be equal across all of the occupational groups i. The PMG model in equation (6) is non-linear in its parameters φ i and (β U , β V ). Therefore, a maximum likelihood estimator is applied (Pesaran/Shin/Smith, 1999: S. 465, see Appendix A.5). Table 2 presents the results for the long-run coefficients and the averaged error-correction term of two variations of the model, one version with cross-sectional lags of the exogenous regressors and one version without. In addition, for these two models, the null hypothesis of a Wald test that states that γ U and γ V are simultaneously equal to zero must be rejected. Given the examined information criteria, the model with the cross-sectional lags of regressors should be preferred over the model without these lags. ; variations with the trend, ω; the cyclical component of the real gross domestic product GDP cyc ; and the cross sectional regressors as long-term parameters in the error-correction term.
The long-run elasticities for vacancies and unemployed workers, the exogenous regressors, the cyclical component of the real GDP, and the trend can be found in the upper part of Table 3 . At the bottom of this table, the following quantities appear: the error-correction term φ, the averages of the estimated short-term parameters for each occupational group and the average fixed effect A (Pesaran/Shin/Smith, 1999: S. 626). The error-correction term φ is significant and negative for all variants of the model. This result indicates the existence of movements against deviations from the long-run equilibrium and therefore implies the existence of stable relationships between matches and both unemployed workers and vacancies.
The long-term coefficients β U , β V , γ U , γ V and GDP cyk are positive, and the trend T is negative and significantly different from zero. These results are robust for all estimated model variations. The impact of the unemployed workers on matches is larger than the impact of the vacancies on matches even after accounting for the 95%-confidence intervals of β V and β U . This finding is in accordance with other studies for Germany (Stops/Mazzoni, 2010; Fahr/Sunde, 2004; Burda/Wyplosz, 1994) . Most of the short-term parameters are significantly different from zero. For all of the examined model variations, there is a significant positive relationship between changes in the number of new hires and changes in the number of vacancies, and a significant negative relationship between changes in the number of new hires and changes in the number of unemployed workers.
Conclusions
This paper analyses matching processes in occupational labour markets in terms of classes of jobs that share commonalities with respect to their required qualifications and tasks.
All previous studies in this field have been based on the assumption that job search and matching processes occur separately for every occupational labour market. However, this assumption is not reasonable, even from a theoretical perspective. From the perspectives of both potential workers and hiring firms, optimal search intensities on each occupational labour market are weighted against the expected gains and costs from the search, the latter of whom could be the (additional) financial burden of the training that is required for a change from one occupation to another. Therefore, workers who are prepared to work in a certain occupation may decide to search for a job in other occupations if the resulting search costs are not overly high relative to the expected gains; similarly, firms with vacancies in a certain occupation may decide to search for workers belonging to other occupations that could be regarded as viable alternatives. This reasoning implies that the processes of job search and matching take place not only within each occupational labour market but also across certain occupational labour markets. I support this prediction by observation of occupational changes in German microdata. I argue that these findings have crucial implications for the estimation of the macroeconomic matching function because the explanation of matches (in terms of new hires) in a certain occupation requires the consideration of not only vacancies and unemployed workers in the occupation of interest but also vacancies and unemployed workers in certain other relevant occupations. I use information about similarities of occupational groups with respect to their capacities to be alternatives in the processes of worker and job searches to construct an "occupational topology". Based on this topology, it is possible to calculate the average of vacancy and unemployed worker stocks in similar occupations for each single occupation. Finally, I estimate an augmented matching function using pooled ordinary least squares, fixed effects and pooled mean-group models that include cross-sectional dependency lags for regressors in terms of vacancies and unemployed workers in similar occupational groups.
The results of this study indicate that there are considerable dependencies between similar occupational groups in the matching process. I reveal the existence of significant and positive matching elasticities of vacancies and the unemployed in similar occupational groups.
This finding has important implications for estimating the matching elasticities of unemployed workers and vacancies; these elasticities are determined not only by the unemployed workers and vacancies in the occupational group of interest but also by the unemployed workers and vacancies in other occupational groups. Furthermore, the results reveal that the returns to scale that are implied by the results of the pooled mean-group model, which considers cross-sectional dependency, are constant. In summary, the findings of this study strongly suggest that to obtain unbiased elasticity estimates, an augmented match-ing function that considers job and worker searches across different occupational labour markets should be employed.
A Appendix
A.1 Theoretical model
A.1.1 Job search and matching on non-separated occupational labour markets
The following paragraphs are based on the work of Burda/Profit (1996) , which provide a spatial extension of the "bulletin board" matching process model that was conceived by Hall (1979) and Pissarides (1979) . Although I use the structure of this model, its interpretation is modified to apply to the context of the current study.
Assume an economy with J occupational labour markets, which are denoted by j = 1, ..., J. There are U j identical unemployed job searchers in each occupational labour market and V j identical firms, each of which is searching for one worker in occupation j.
All of the prospective workers reach decisions about their search intensity in two separate dimensions. Assuming that these workers choose to engage in a search for employment, they can decide to search in more than one occupational group, and they fix the number of jobs that they apply for in each occupation. In accordance with Burda/Profit (1996) , I assume that the return on an effective search in terms of the wage w is equal over all potential occupations. An application or a job interview costs c + a u D ij and can be regarded as a random draw. The terms c and a u are constants, and D ij is a measure for the dissimilarity of the occupations i and j 15 . Thus, D ij refers to the capacity of occupations to be alternatives to each other in the search and matching process. The term a u D ij denotes additional costs for job searches in other occupational groups. These costs result from the financial burden of the additional training that would be required to change from one occupation to another. Generally, these costs will be greater for occupations that are less similar to each other.
The job searchers decide on their search intensities for each occupation, which can be denoted by their optimal number of job interviews N * ij in occupation j. To keep the model simple, workers' search costs are assumed to be relatively small. This assumption implies that income effects from searches for jobs in other similar occupations can be ignored.
Therefore, optimal search intensities can be analysed within each occupation j. The probability of obtaining a job after an interview within occupation j is provided by p j for each occupation j = 1, ..., J. The job searcher is assumed to maximise the (net) utility of the job search, which is equal to the difference between the revenue from the job search and the costs of this search:
In the above equation, {[1 − (1 − p j ) N ij ]w/r} denotes the expected revenue to a job searcher who is currently in occupation i from realising N ij interviews in occupation j, given p j , the probability of obtaining a job, and the assumption that a worker cannot hold more than one job at any given time. I also assume that the expected income of unemployment is zero. It can be shown that the first-order condition of the optimisation problem in (7) can be expressed as follows:
with the following solution:
).
For small p j , I obtain the following approximation:
Therefore, optimal job search intensity depends positively on the ratio of the gains to the costs of a particular job search. A higher wage w has positive effects on job search intensity, whereas higher search costs and higher interest rates have negative effects on this intensity. The effects of a change in p j , the probability of obtaining a job, are not clear; a higher probability leads to higher expected revenues of the job search, but this increased probability also implies that less intensive job searching will be required to obtain a given level of expected benefits. The differentiation of the upper case on the right-hand side of equation (10) leads to the following expression:
Equation (11) implies that a higher p j has negative effects on the optimal search intensity if the expected gain from a job search is significantly larger than the search costs ((w/r)p j >> c + a u D ij ). Given the assumption of low search costs, an increase of p j will, cet. par., reduce the search intensity. Furthermore, the optimal choice of search intensity determines the range of the job search. Because the job search intensity must be positive, a maximum measure of similarity of occupational groups is present; this result can be derived from equation (10):
An increasing maximum of the job-finding probabilities over p j leads to a higher optimal range D i . Furthermore, this range decreases with increasing dissimilarity costs a u and increasing search costs c.
In the next step of the analysis, the unconditional job finding probabilities in any occupation can be derived from the optimal number of interviews in occupation j in which job searchers from occupation i ∈ 1, ..., J have participated. I assume that there is no information exchange between job searchers. Therefore, it is reasonable that certain vacancies could attract many applicants, whereas other vacancies do not attach strong applicant interest. Furthermore, I assume that all vacancies in all occupations V j = V are known by all job searchers (in other words, a "bulletin board" of potential jobs exists). Consequently, the decision of job searchers in a certain occupation to search in other occupations depends on the competitive contexts among all of the job searchers in that occupation. By defining U j ≡ i N ij * u i as the sum of applications by unemployed workers, I approximately derive the probability that a vacancy will not be considered as follows:
The job finding probability, p j , can now be derived. This probability will be equal to the ratio of the number of vacancies considered (V j −V j exp(− U j V j )) to U j , the number of applications that were submitted by unemployed workers:
Finally, in accordance with Burda/Profit (1996) , a matching function that returns the number of flows from unemployment to employment in an occupation i can be formulated:
In the equation above, U and V denote the vectors of the number of unemployed workers and vacancies in each occupation, P i represents the probability that a job searcher in occupation i will receive at least one job offer. This probability is equal to 1 minus the probability of receiving no job offer from all occupations.
The matching function above relates exits from unemployment to employment in a certain occupation to the labour market situation in every occupation. From an empirical perspective, a problem arises, namely, the optimal search intensity cannot be observed. To address this issue, according to Burda/Profit (1996) , this matching function could be addressed in a quasi-reduced form that regards vacancies and wages as given quantities. This approach renders it possible to study the effects of the changes in the number of unemployed workers and vacancies on the number of matches:
The first term in equation (16) is positive, implying that an increase in the number of unemployed workers in occupation i leads to more matches M i given a particular (constant) probability P i . The sign of the second term could be either negative or positive. This term represents the external effect of additional unemployed workers on the job-finding probabilities of workers who are already unemployed in occupation i. Burda/Profit (1996) showed that, in theory, for the second terms in equations (17) and (18), both positive and negative external effects are plausible:
Analogously to (19), the first derivative of the job-finding probability P i with respect to the vacancies v τ is expressed as follows:
The effect on the job-finding probability P i induced by an increase either in unemployment or in the vacancies in occupation τ results from the weighted average of the effects on the (unconditional) job finding probabilities in all occupations ∂p j /∂u τ . Therefore, these results represent the net effect of variation in p j for j = 1, ..., J. A change in p j directly affects the job-finding probability for unemployed workers in occupation i given a search intensity of [N * ij /(1 − p j )]∂p j /∂u τ in a situation involving the variation of u τ and a search intensity of [N * ij /(1 − p j )]∂p j /∂v τ in a situation involving the variation of v τ . This change indirectly affects the optimal search intensity in all occupations and the employment prospects of the unemployed workers in occupation i, (∂N * ij /∂p j ) ln(1 − p j )(∂p j /∂u τ ). Therefore, the sign of ∂P i /∂u τ in a situation involving a cet. par. change of u τ depends on the spillover effects, ∂p j /∂u τ , which provide feedback to P i by affecting search intensity. The same argument holds for ∂P i /∂v τ in a situation involving a cet. par. change of v τ and the spillover effects of ∂p j /∂v τ . This model structure allows for the conditions for positive (or negative) external effects of job searches across different occupations to be defined. The starting point of this model is the total differential of the job-finding probability in equation (14) for occupation j.
A.1.2 The matching elasticities of unemployed workers
To obtain a prediction for the matching elasticities of unemployed workers, only the unemployment in occupation τ should be allowed to vary:
In the above equation, as discussed by Burda/Profit (1996) , κ j is assumed to be smaller than zero 16 . The change in the unconditional finding rate dp j of occupation j reacts to du τ via two channels. First, for κ j < 0, there is a negative direct effect due to the dilution of jobfinding prospects. The second indirect effect of a change in u τ results from the shift in the search intensity of the unemployed who are searching in occupation j; this shift is caused 16 Given equation (14) for pj, this assumption holds true for by the implications of the change in u τ on their job-finding probabilities p k (∂N * kj /∂p k , for k = 1, ..., J, including k = j). In accordance with equation (10), it must be concluded that the optimal search intensity N * kj for occupation j of an unemployed worker in occupation k depends only on the job-finding probability in occupation j and does not depend on this probability in occupation k, which implies that ∂N * kj /∂p k = 0 except for k = j 17 .
Therefore, equation 21 can be simplified to the following form:
After several simple transformations, I obtain the following expression:
The sign of ∂p j /∂u τ depends on the sign and the absolute value of κ j u j (∂N * jj /∂p j ). The standard situation in job matching theory is ∂N * jj /∂p j = 0. This situation would lead to a negative external effect 18 . According to equation (19), the condition of ∂P i /∂u τ > 0, which represents a positive external effect, results in the following range for the elasticity
A.1.3 The matching elasticities of vacancies
In contrast to the previous subsection, the number of vacancies in occupation τ should be allowed to vary, cet. par.; in this situation, the total differential of equation (14) is as follows:
Again, κ j is assumed to be smaller than zero. Analogously to the previous finding, I find once again that a change in the number of vacancies in occupation τ has effects on the job-finding probability via two channels; these effects are different and merit further consideration. In particular, an increase in the vacancy stock produces a direct and positive effect on job-finding probabilities because of the change in the supply of vacancies. The second indirect effect can be ascribed to changes in the optimal search strategy. As discussed above, equation (10) implies that ∂N * kj /∂p k = 0 except for k = j; therefore, equation (26) may be simplified as follows:
17 This holds only under the strong assumption of small costs and no substitution effects between occupational labour markets, which would be important in the case of budget constraints and income effects. However, a theoretical treatment of this case is left for further research.
18 I obtain the same result if ∂N * jj /∂pj > 0. A positive external effect is induced by ∂N * jj /∂pj > 1 κ j u j , given κj, ∂N * jj /∂pj < 0.
allowing me to obtain the following equation:
In either the standard case (∂N * jj /∂p j = 0) or the situation in which ∂N * jj /∂p j < 1 κ j u j , given κ j < 0, I would obtain a positive external effect. Using equation (20), I can derive the condition for ∂P i /∂v τ > 0, which results in the following range for the elasticity η N ij ,p j :
A.1.4 Conclusions for the matching elasticities
The absolute values of η N ij ,p j will vary with the similarity of the occupations i and j. In particular, workers will not seek interviews in occupations that are not similar to their original occupation; therefore, the condition above will not hold for all combinations of occupations j and i. In the model mechanisms conceived by Burda/Profit (1996) , it can be demonstrated that both positive and negative external effects are conceivable. Within a certain range of η N ij ,p j , the external effects of vacancies and unemployed can both be positive. 19
A.2 Additional informational tables Only vacancies V can be observed that are registered by the Federal Employment Service. To estimate the matching function, it would be ideal to know of all vacancies V ALL . R BA denotes the proportion of all vacancies V ALL that are composed of registered vacancies V :
Employers register their vacancies if they expect that searches for workers via the Federal Employment Service will be successful. During economic booms, the number of registered job searchers decreases. This phenomenon is noticed by firms; therefore, it could be assumed that firms have more negative expectations about their abilities to find staff through the Federal Employment Service during prosperous economic times. In accordance with 21 In addition to the following subsection, please compare with Stops/Mazzoni (2010) (vgl. Franz, 2006: S. 107 f.), R BA decreases during economic recovery phases; in other words, this variable is anticyclical. Therefore, the (logarithm of) R BA correlates negatively with the cyclical component of the real gross domestic product (GDP cyc ). This component could be interpreted as the deviation of the GDP from its long-term trend. Therefore, GDP cyc is an indicator for the economic situation at a certain time; consequently, the rate R BA could be regarded as a function of GDP cyc :
R BA = f (GDP cyc ).
Thus,
and after several simple rearrangements, I obtain
The matching function is specified by the following expression:
Taking the logarithm of both sides yields
The use of equation (33) allows this equation to be rewritten as follows:
The assumption log f (GDP cyc ) ∼ = (−β gdp GDP cyc ) permits the following simplification:
where β GDP = (−β V ) · (−β gdp ). Finally, the assumptions β V > 0 and β gdp > 0 imply that β GDP > 0.
A.5 Concentrated maximum likelihood estimation
The concentrated likelihood that is used to estimate the model in equation (6) has the following form: 22
where
, with ϑ as the vector of the coefficients H i = I T − L i (L i L i )L i for an identity matrix I T , whereas
are included in the logarithm of the density function of the normal distribution. 22 The equation is expressed in terms of vectors and matrices (bold letters). Data for different observation times are staggered in the columns of the matrices or in the vectors; therefore, the index t becomes expendable.
A.6 Additional empirical results
A.6.1 The pooled OLS model 
